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Edited by

Frauke Lachenmann
Tilmann J. Röder
Rüdiger Wolfrum



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The Politics of Recognition: Changing Understandings of Human Rights, Social Development and Land Rights as Normative Foundation of Global Social Policy

*Lutz Leisering, Benjamin Davy and Ulrike Davy**

Abstract

The recent literature has identified ‘global social policy’ as a new field of global politics. The assumption is that since the 1990s ‘social’ issues have moved to global agendas which had been dominated by military and security matters and by economic issues. We inquire into the normative foundations of the new policy field. We conceive of social recognition – recognition of social problems, of individuals and groups in need, and of collective social responsibility – as the most basic normative and cognitive foundation of social policy. We, therefore, investigate if, when and how global politics of social recognition have emerged since the 1940s, focussing on human rights, social development, and land rights. We argue that these three fields have become key arenas for the recognition of the social, underpinning the rise of global social policy. The three fields emerged in the 1940s and 1950s but, as we demonstrate, only changing interpretations and understandings of human rights, of social development, and of land rights turned them into unequivocal normative foundations of social policy. The recognition perspective also highlights limitations of global social policy, such as a recognition overload and categorically bridled universalism. The article draws on interdisciplinary empirical work from law, sociology and land policy.

Keywords

Global Social Policy – Development – Human Rights – Land – Recognition – Social Protection – Social Rights – Universalism – World Society

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I Introduction: In Search of the Socio-Cultural Foundations of Global Social Policy

The term 'social' as used in 'social policy' originated in mid-19th century Germany and France to denote a critical stance vis-à-vis the living conditions of early capitalism, juxtaposed with the 'economic.'¹ After World War II, Western countries developed social policy into the wider configuration of the 'welfare state.' Since the 1990s, social policy has gone global, as Bob Deacon has argued.² Deacon diagnosed a "socialization of global politics": According to Deacon, 'social' issues have moved to global agendas which had been dominated by military and security matters and by economic issues; international organizations increasingly engage in the social field.³ The book by Deacon et al. of 1997 and the journal 'Global Social Policy' which Deacon founded in 2001 have established global social policy as an academic field.⁴

Global social policy is part of the wider 'social dimension of globalization' to which the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization drew attention in its 2004 report 'A Fair Globalization.'⁵ While the social dimension may refer to structural policies regarding the international terms of trade, finance and governance, in this article we use 'global social policy' in the narrower sense of policies that directly address individual welfare and individual social rights, regarding, e.g., old-age pensions, family allowances and social assistance. This is akin to what is conventionally seen as the domain of the welfare state in Western countries.

Social concerns in international politics are not new. The International Labor Organization (ILO) has promoted labor standards since its foundation

group FLOOR at Bielefeld University and Technische Universität Dortmund (www.floorgroup.de), both Germany, mainly funded by the German Research Foundation (*Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft*) (principal investigators: the authors).

1 F.-X. Kaufmann, 'Thinking About Social Policy. The German Tradition'. *German Social Policy* vol. 1 (ed. by L. Leisering) (Springer 2013) 32.

2 B. Deacon et al., *Global Social Policy. International Organizations and the Future of Welfare* (Sage 1997).

3 Ibid. 2–4. For the World Bank, e.g., see A. Hall, 'Social Policies in the World Bank' (2007) 7 *Global Social Policy* 151; for pensions see M.A. Orenstein, *Privatizing Pensions. The Transnational Campaign for Social Security Reform* (Princeton University Press 2008).

4 Deacon et al., *Global Social Policy*.

5 World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, *A Fair Globalization. Creating Opportunities for All* (ILO 2004).

in 1919.⁶ The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights included social rights.⁷ And development policies for the Global South that evolved in the 1950s have included the aim of raising living standards, even if through economic growth rather than individualized ‘social’ programs. However, in the 1990s, ‘social’ issues came to the fore on a broader scale. Deacon’s work started from the transformation in Eastern Europe after the fall of the iron curtain in 1990 when global actors like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund assumed powers also in the field of social policy.⁸ For Deacon and Orenstein (2008) the 1990s mark the emergence of global social policy.⁹ However, much about this new policy area still needs to be researched, including basic questions like when and to what extent global social policy has actually emerged and what it is about. In this article we aim to both deepen and qualify Deacon’s thesis of a “socialization of global politics” by inquiring into the socio-cultural foundations of global social policy which, as we argue, are to be found in processes of social recognition. By elaborating the recognition side of social policy, we also want to contribute to recent debates on theorizing global social policy.¹⁰ Our analysis draws on original global data bases constructed by the authors.¹¹

6 Originally, the Permanent Organization of Labor (a general conference of representatives of the members and an International Labor Office) was established by the peace treaties ending World War I. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (signed 28 June 1919, entered into force 10 January 1920) (1919) 225 CTS 188 (Versailles Peace Treaty), Part XIII on labor, emphasizing that universal peace can be secured only if it is based on social justice, and that the realization of social justice requires the improvement of the conditions of labor worldwide. In 1948, the (amended) constitution of the International Labor Organization was published anew as an annex to the Instrument for the Amendment of the Constitution of the International Labor Organization (signed 9 October 1946, entered into force 20 April 1948) 15 UNTS 40.

7 UNGA Res 217 A (III) ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (10 December 1948) GAOR 3rd Session Part I Resolutions 71 Arts. 22–25.

8 B. Deacon et al., *The New Eastern Europe: Social Policy Past, Present and Future* (Sage 1992).

9 Orenstein, *Privatizing Pensions*.

10 See A. Kaasch (guest ed), *Conceptualizing Global Social Policy* (2013) 13 Global Social Policy, Special Issue 1.

11 The database ICESCR-SPR 2011 (revised in 2012) encompasses data drawn from the reports under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) from the beginning of 1977, when the first State Party reports were submitted following the entry into force of the Covenant, through the end of 2011. The database FLOOR-CASH (version 2012/2013) includes all social cash transfer schemes in all countries of the Global South for which data were available, with a broad range of characteristics of the schemes covered. The data are constructed

Deacon et al. conceived of global social policy as activities of international organizations relating to regulation,¹² above all to the regulation of labor, and to redistribution, especially to social protection (and, marginally, to provision). This definition centers on socio-economic resources and socio-economic relationships. We refer to this socio-economic paradigm by the shorthand expression 'redistribution.' Other representatives of the dominant political economy approach to social policy, above all Esping-Andersen (1990),¹³ also focus on redistribution. Against this dominant paradigm (or rather complementing it) we argue that social recognition – recognition of social problems, of individuals and groups in need, and of collective social responsibility – is a neglected side of global social policy, and that a growing recognition of social issues has been part and parcel of the rise of global social policy over the post-World War II era. Acts of recognition may stand alone as a form of global social policy in their own right, such as the 'International Day of Older Persons',¹⁴ without major redistributive measures attached. But policies of recognition often precede and underlie policies of redistribution.

We start from the assumption that redistributive policies need a normative underpinning to emerge and be sustainable. The rise of redistributive policies presupposes socio-cultural changes – changing perceptions, beliefs and attitudes in global arenas regarding the social. While the normative foundation of social policy is often seen in social *Weltanschauungen* or ideologies like social democracy, social conservatism or social liberalism, we focus on recognition as a deeper and more specific socio-cultural layer of the social that may cut across the great ideologies. Recognition refers to basic normative or cognitive categories, for example whether a social problem or a group in need is identified at all and in what terms. When talking about social policy, these 'politics of recognition' are usually taken for granted,¹⁵ but rarely examined more closely. In this article, we therefore inquire if, when and how global politics of recognizing the social have emerged and changed since the 1940s. We also

from national governmental websites, reports by international organizations and existing global databases.

12 Deacon, *Global Social Policy* 2f.

13 G. Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton University Press 1990).

14 UNGA Res 45/106 'Implementation of the International Plan of Action on Aging and Related Activities' (14 December 1990) GAOR 45th Session Suppl 49 No. 15 ('International Day for the Elderly'), later rephrased as 'International Day of Older Persons'.

15 E.g., explicitly by P. Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity. Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875–1975* (CUP 1990) 12.

trace the collective agents of the politics of recognition and the limits of recognition. Empirically, we analyze three fields that we consider key arenas of social recognition: human rights, social development (with an emphasis on social security), and land rights.

While an analysis of redistribution is about 'hard' issues like statutes, social spending, benefit levels and statistics on the number of persons covered by welfare entitlements, an analysis of social recognition is about 'soft' issues, such as changing social discourses and ideas. These changes may be difficult to trace, because, as we seek to demonstrate in this article, the ideational change it is not just about the emergence of the categories of human rights, social development and land rights as such. These categories were established in the 1940s and 1950s (with earlier precedents), marking major changes in legal and political discourses. But, as we argue in this article, only changes in the interpretation and understanding of human rights, of social development, and of land rights that occurred in the following decades have turned these three categories into unequivocal legal and socio-cultural underpinnings of global social policy.

The paper is an interdisciplinary endeavor and partly written from the perspective of different disciplines (law, sociology of social policy, land policy). Quite remarkably, our findings dovetail.

The paper is in six sections: The next section (Section two) outlines the conceptual framework of redistribution and recognition in social policy. We distinguish three kinds of recognition: embedded, symbolic and constitutionalized recognition. Sections three to five deal with the three fields of social recognition (human rights, social development, land rights), corresponding to the three disciplines. Section three (law) addresses the constitutional level of global social policy as encapsulated in the United Nations human rights system (what we propose to term 'constitutionalized recognition'). The emphasis here is not so much on the legal body of rights as such or on issues of enforcement or justiciability, as highlighted in most of the global social policy literature¹⁶ or the social (human) rights literature.¹⁷ We take a new and different approach, concentrating instead on the interpretation of human rights by the States participating in the processes of creating and implementing social

16 See, e.g., B. Deacon, *Global Social Policy and Governance* (Sage 2007) 136–137.

17 E.g. A. Eide, C. Krause and A. Rosas (eds), *Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A Textbook* (2nd ed Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2001); B. Saul, D. Kinley and J. Mowbray, *The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Commentary, Cases, and Materials* (OUP 2014); M. Langford (ed), *Social Rights Jurisprudence. Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law* (CUP 2008).

rights. We argue that, over the course of the post-war era, the States' interpretation has changed considerably. These shifts in interpretation led to changes in the meaning and the conceptualization of social (human) rights.¹⁸

Section four traces changes in the (symbolic and embedded) recognition of the social in social security, especially in development contexts. Social security and 'social development' have been part of development policy in the global South since the 1950s and even earlier, but we show that only later changes in the interpretation of the social aspect of development came to underpin the rise of more extensive redistributive policies. In this section, we do not analyze concepts of social security in Western welfare states nor in the countries that were socialist till 1990, since the social policies of international organizations, even if informed by Northern traditions, have largely evolved in response to social problems in the global South. Challenges included mass poverty, weak economies and states and scant formal social protection. By contrast, Northern social policies after 1945 could build on a substantial arrangement of formal social security that was extended in the following decades through domestic democratic processes rather than international organizations.

Section five examines changes in the (symbolic as well as constitutionalized) recognition of the social in land policy. Land policy is conventionally not considered part of present-day social policy in Western countries, but the land question was a key social question in many developing countries when they became independent States. We argue, that land policy and land rights have been part of the wider historical move towards recognizing the social in global politics over the post-war period. A conclusion follows.

The global politics of social recognition have a wider bearing beyond politics. Deacon and other writers see redistributive global social policy as a way to counteract the soaring economic inequalities attendant on global capitalism. Following Kaufmann,¹⁹ we argue that social policy responds to even wider problems of societal integration, and, in particular, that the recognition side of global social policy addresses socio-cultural aspects of the integration of world society not directly addressed by redistributive policies.

18 Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (concluded 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, "subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation" is to be taken into account when the terms of a treaty are being interpreted according to their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty; see Art. 31 (3b).

19 F.-X. Kaufmann, *European Foundations of the Welfare State* (Berghahn Publishers 2012) 21–23.

II Social Policy as Recognition

The distinction between redistribution and recognition became prominent in 1997 on the occasion of the actual or possible demise of two historical 'projects', socialism and the welfare state. Fraser inquired into the future of the idea of justice in a post-socialist age,²⁰ arguing that the 'socialist imaginary' had relied on socio-economic restructuring and (like the 'surface' variety of socialism, the liberal welfare state) on redistribution in view of achieving equality while an upcoming new imaginary emphasized culture,²¹ identities and the recognition of difference. In welfare state theory, Kaufmann asserted that the welfare state had always been about advancing social recognition.²² Kaufmann saw recognition, even more than redistribution, as a key source of the integration of society which is commonly considered the overarching achievement and legitimization of the post-war welfare state.

Kaufmann argued that the nation state will continue to be the crucial arena of social solidarity and recognition rather than supranational entities like the European Union or even the world society and multi-level governance.²³ Thus, while Deacon did not say much about recognition in global social policy, Kaufmann even denied that recognition could play a major role in global social policy in the foreseeable future.

Redistribution emphasizes socio-economic resources while recognition is about culture, symbols and group identities. Regarding mechanisms, redistribution is about the enactment and the implementation of social law (in particular with respect to social security or social assistance), bureaucracy and money while recognition involves representation, interpretation and communication.²⁴ But redistribution and recognition are not opposite principles, they are two sides of the social which may mix and interact, with sometimes conflicting rationales.

In the history of social policy, we find two basic types of relationships between recognition and redistribution: recognition and redistribution can be linked or be relatively independent. In the case of linkage we propose to speak of 'embedded recognition', referring to redistributive welfare institutions like social insurance that imply a recognition of the beneficiaries. In the case of

20 N. Fraser, *Justice Interruptus* (Routledge 1997).

21 *Ibid.* 11.

22 F.-X. Kaufmann, 'Schwindet die integrative Funktion des Sozialstaats?' in F.-X. Kaufmann, *Sozialpolitik und Sozialstaat* (Leske + Budrich 2002, first 1997) 255.

23 *Ibid.* 252, 259.

24 Fraser, *Justice Interruptus* 15.

independence we speak of 'symbolic recognition', referring to cultural artefacts that communicate the worth of individuals or groups even if recognition does not materialize in the institutionalization of welfare schemes. 'Symbolic recognition' is ambivalent: it can be just 'hot air', but it can also be a powerful tool of creating identities and mobilizing people. By 'constitutionalized recognition' we refer to a generalized and more legally binding variety of symbolic recognition that we treat as a third type of recognition. Constitutionalized recognition may be expressed in national constitutions and in international declarations and covenants of human rights. In this way, States acknowledge a responsibility for recognizing and addressing social need (a kind of meta recognition).

The concept of symbolic recognition echoes Marshall's analysis of the relationship between citizenship rights and social inequality. In a community of individual rights-holders, Marshall argued, persons have 'equal worth' even if they differ in the resource dimension: "Equality of status is more important than equality of income."²⁵ That is, the redistribution and the recognition sides of social policy may diverge. Some policies are designed to merely change symbolic orders and discourses while others are meant to trigger redistributive measures and structural reforms (in the latter case, the underlying symbolic recognition could be called 'remedial recognition'). Recognition in the face of dire straits may be a purposive action, announcing a brighter future.

Symbolic recognition becomes tangible in discourses – like the human rights discourse or the redefinition of poverty as a human rights problem – and in lead semantics, like 'pro-poor-growth', 'pro-poor-land policy', 'human development', 'dignity' and 'vulnerable groups.' Policies and mechanisms of recognition include global declarations, conventions, campaigns, summits (like the UN World Assemblies on Ageing, 1982 and 2002),²⁶ 'world events' and memorial days (like the International Day of Older Persons, on 1 October). Some of these instruments may have a remedial character, for example the International Plan of Action on Ageing drafted by the UN World Assembly on Ageing in 2002.²⁷ The rise of democracy in many non-Western countries and the

25 T.H. Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', in T.H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class and other Essays* (CUP 1950) 1, 56. For a general non-egalitarian reading of Marshall, see M. Powell, 'The Hidden History of Social citizenship' (2002) 6 *Citizenship Studies* 229.

26 See the UN World Assembly on Ageing 'Report' (1982) UN Doc A/CONF.113/31, and the UN World Assembly on Ageing (2nd) 'Report' (2002) UN Doc A/CONF.197/9.

27 UN World Assembly on Ageing (2nd) 'Annex IV to the Report of the Commission for Social Development: Draft International Plan of Action on Ageing – Consolidated Text' (6 March 2002) UN Doc A/CONF.197/3/Add.2.

creation of the United Nations in 1945 with a growing number of affiliated organizations have facilitated the emergence of a global symbolic order – or even ‘world culture’ – which through principles like universalism and individualism promotes a widening recognition of individuals and social groups.²⁸

III Social Rights under the UN Human Rights System: The Growing Constitutional Recognition of Individual Welfare

1 *Social Rights – A Clear-Cut Case for Constitutional Recognition?*

A Declaration of Human Rights (the UDHR) that includes social rights²⁹ and the making of a legally binding treaty codifying social rights at UN level seem perfect examples of (symbolic) acts recognizing collective responsibilities with respect to ‘individual welfare.’ For one, the recitals of the UDHR start with the “recognition of the inherent dignity...of all members of the human family,” and there can be no doubt that lawmakers were aware (and yet proud) of the symbolic character of the declaration.³⁰ Each of the rights of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) is explicitly “recognized.”³¹ For another, the ICESCR unmistakably addresses State responsibilities. The goal of the ICESCR is the (future) realization of the rights; that goal is a State undertaking.³² Finally, the substantive articles of the ICESCR constantly

28 J.W. Meyer, *World Society* (OUP 2009).

29 For the sake of convenience, we use the term ‘social rights’ in a broad sense. The term is short for work-related rights and rights focusing on social security, health, the protection of the family, or an adequate standard of living. In human rights parlance of the late 1940s and early 1950s, the umbrella term for these rights was ‘economic and social rights’. Human rights law-makers of the post-war period chose to not differentiate between ‘economic’ and ‘social’ rights. The right to education (Arts. 13 and 14 ICESCR) was seen as a ‘cultural’ right. On the terminology preferred by State representatives in the aftermath of World War II see N.-C. Himpe, “Das Soziale” in der Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte. Ein Kompromiss zwischen Staaten der Welt (FLOOR Working Paper No. 17, 2013 Bielefeld University).

30 See J. Morsink, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Origins, Drafting & Intent* (University of Pennsylvania Press 1999) 12–20.

31 See, e.g., *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3, Art. 6 (1) (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work”) or Art. 9 (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right [...] to social security, including social insurance”).

32 Art. 2 (1) ICESCR reads: “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving

refer to “rights of everyone.”³³ The States Parties are clearly the immediate agents of recognition; the international community acts as an indirect agent, merely facilitating the constitutionalization of the recognition of ‘rights.’

Still, following the formal adoption of social rights (UDHR, ICESCR), legal scholars contended that the rights were not really (individual) rights in a true sense, since they were not backed by a mechanism securing litigation before an international court.³⁴ Others emphasized that the rights are nothing more than empty promises given the pitiful State of affairs in many poor countries.³⁵ We will not engage in this debate.³⁶ We rather turn to the more recent assumption, e.g. by the Department for International Development (DFID, United Kingdom),³⁷ that the rights of the ICESCR imply individual entitlements to (individual) welfare akin to the ‘social rights’ T.H. Marshall described when giving his account of the birth of the European welfare state.³⁸ If that were correct, (social) human rights would indeed strongly indicate a move toward global social policy, even a globalization of European welfare statism.

Yet, the case is not that clear-cut. We argue that this individualized understanding is not the only one that has been attached to social (human) rights in the global arena. The individualized understanding is a very recent one. When elaborating on our argument, we will turn to the history of human rights and concentrate on concepts promoted by States, as States have been (and still are) the main driving forces behind the development of human rights, including social rights. Assumptions as to why States (eventually) came to promote social rights on the international level (and not just civil and political rights) abound. Yet, thorough

progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”

33 See, e.g., Art. 6 (1) ICESCR, stating: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts” or Art. 9 ICESCR providing: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance.”

34 E.W. Vierdag, ‘The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1978) 9 *Netherlands Yearbook of International Law* 69; more differentiated L. Henkin, ‘International Human Rights as “Rights”’ (1979) 1 *Cardozo L. Rev.* 425 (440–446). Doubts about the legal character of social rights are also voiced in social policy literature, e.g., by Deacon, *Global Social Policy and Governance* 137.

35 M. Cranston, *What are Human Rights?* (Bodley Head 1973) 65.

36 For a recent critique, see L. Buschmann, *Das Menschenrecht auf soziale Grundsicherung aus Art. 9 und Art. 11 ICESCR* (agenda 2013) 101.

37 Department for International Development (DFID), *Social Transfers and Chronic Poverty: Emerging Evidence and the Challenge Ahead* (DFID practice paper 2005) 6.

38 T.H. Marshall, ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ 10.

analyses of the records of the U.N. decision-making – giving first-hand information on the position of States' representations as they debated social rights in the context of the UDHR or the ICESCR – are still rare.³⁹ Drawing on data collected in an in-depth-study covering the States' position vis-à-vis social rights from 1945 through 2012, we can rectify some of the master narratives.⁴⁰

2 *The Many Roots and Meanings of Social Human Rights (1940s to 1966)*

A historical analysis demonstrates that the social rights of the UDHR and the ICESCR have many roots and meanings, some of which do not reflect notions of interpersonal redistribution or the recognition of individual social needs (mostly defined in terms of groups in need) that characterize the European welfare state and – to some extent – socialist welfare. The driving forces behind the internationalization of social rights were neither the United States and its Western European allies,⁴¹ nor the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies.⁴² The fiercest champions were the Latin American states whose contributions are often underrated.⁴³ Against the backdrop of some newly enacted constitutions, the Latin American states – most importantly Chile, Cuba, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay – wanted human rights law-making to pursue a two-pronged approach when dealing with social rights, and that approach reflected a broader, un-European understanding of welfare.

The Latin American states fought for clauses promising, quite generally, social justice, progress, or modernization. The clauses were inspired by

39 From a (rather general) political science perspective, see J. Morsink, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights* 191.

40 For a more detailed account, see U. Davy, 'Social Citizenship Going International: Changes in the Reading of UN-Sponsored Economic and Social Rights' in B. Davy, U. Davy and L. Leisering (eds), *Exploring Global Social Citizenship: Human Rights Perspectives* (2013) 22 *International Journal of Social Welfare*, Supplement 1 S15; U. Davy, 'The Rise of the "Global Social." Origins and Transformations of Social Rights under UN Human Rights Law' (2013) 3 *International Journal of Social Quality* 41; U. Davy, 'How Human Rights Shape Social Citizenship: On Citizenship and the Understanding of Economic and Social Rights' (2014) 13 *Washington University Global Studies Law Review* 201.

41 As suggested by Kaufmann, *European Foundations of the Welfare State* 107, 109.

42 As suggested by A. Woodiwiss, *Making Human Rights Work Globally* (Glasshouse Press 2003) 25.

43 But see S. Waltz, 'Universalizing Human Rights: The Role of Small States in the Construction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (2001) 23 *Human Rights Quarterly* 44; M.A. Glendon, 'The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin American Influence on the Universal Human Rights Idea' (2003) 16 *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 27.

constitutional provisions such as Art. 22 of the 1945 Constitution of Guatemala declaring:

It is a function of the State to conserve and improve the general conditions of the nation, to procure the well-being of its inhabitants and to increase wealth by means of the creation and encouragement of institutions of credit and social welfare.⁴⁴

In line with that thinking, the Latin American proposals regarding the (human) right to food, housing, or an adequate standard of living clearly envisioned collective rather than individual welfare.⁴⁵ Latin American states also fought for human rights provisions focusing on individual welfare, such as the right to social security, a right promising individual benefits in the case of contingencies like old age, sickness, invalidity.⁴⁶ Either way, the rights had strong redistributive implications (land reform; social security for the urban poor). Finally, Latin American countries fought for giving details with regard to the State duties implied in the rights.⁴⁷

The United States (and its Western European allies), on the other hand, were prepared to accept social rights, but opposed any attempts to concretize what States were supposed to do when putting the rights into practice.⁴⁸ Western democracies clearly favored symbolic recognition of State responsibilities. The Eastern European countries took a third stand. Eastern European countries had their own particular view on the relation between the State and the individual, and they insisted on elaborating State duties, especially in the context of social rights.⁴⁹ Yet, their proposals often mirrored socialist ideas, such as the idea that social insurance ought to be organized at the expenses of

44 A.M. Peaslee, *Constitutions of Nations. The first Compilation in the English Language of the Texts of the Constitutions of the Various Nations of the World, Together With Summaries, Annotations, Bibliographies, and Comparative Tables. Volume 1. Afghanistan to Finland* (Martinus Nijhoff 1950) 71. Digitalized by the Internet Archive in 2011, available at <http://www.archive.org/details/constitutionsofno1peas> (accessed 5 October 2014).

45 UNGA 'Statement of Essential Human Rights Presented by the Delegation of Panama (Provisional Agenda for the Second Part of the First Session). Item 6 of the Supplementary List' (24 October 1946) UN Doc A/148, 11–12 (Art. 14 on the right to food and housing, including a comment).

46 *Ibid.* 13 (Art. 15 on the right to social security and comment).

47 U. Davy, 'How Human Rights Shape Social Citizenship' 222.

48 *Ibid.* 224.

49 *Ibid.* 225–226.

the State and the employer only,⁵⁰ or the idea that social rights ought to be closely tied to individual duties.⁵¹ The redistributive implications of the rights were supposed to affect the non-socialist world only.

In the end, the social rights of the UDHR and the ICESCR were a compromise between the positions of the Latin American states and the position of the United States (plus allies), with some rather moderate contributions by the Eastern European countries. Or, to put it from the perspective of ideas: Social rights have roots in developmental thinking primarily concerned with the advancement of the living conditions of the public at large; they have roots in liberalism focusing on individual welfare; and they have roots in socialism where collective welfare derives from planned economies, individual welfare is linked to individual duties owed to the community, and socio-economic equality is secured. The language of social rights thus combined many readings, according to ideational background and context. To give some brief examples: The right to work (Art. 6 ICESCR) obliges States to enact laws protecting the workers from excessive powers of the employer (and that probably implies the granting of individual rights vis-à-vis the employer).⁵² But Art. 6 also obliges States to resort to adequate employment policies (not necessarily involving individual rights).⁵³ Art. 9 ICESCR (right to social security), again, is obviously

50 UN ECOSOC 'Report of the Fifth Session of the Commission on Human Rights to the Economic and Social Council, Lake Success, New York, 9 May–20 June 1949' (23 June 1949) UN Doc E/1371, 48; later UN Commission on Human Rights 'Draft International Covenant on Human Rights and Measures of Implementation. USSR: Draft Articles for Inclusion in the Draft International Covenant on Human Rights' (16 April 1951) UN Doc E/CN.4/537.

51 UN Commission on Human Rights, Summary Record of the Fourteenth Meeting. Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 4 February 1947 (5 February 1947) UN Doc E/CN.4/SR.14, 3 (statement by Mr. Teplakov, USSR).

52 The rights enumerated in Art. 7 ICESCR (right to the enjoyment of just and favorable conditions of work) include, *inter alia*, a right to a remuneration providing a decent living for all workers, and a right to rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay. When implementing these human rights on the national level, States need to translate the rights into (statutory) rights (addressed to employers) enforceable in a (national) court of law.

53 Art. 6 (2) ICESCR states with respect to the right to work:

The steps to be taken by a State Party [...] to achieve the full realization of this right shall include technical and vocational guidance and training programs, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and full and productive employment under conditions safeguarding fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual.

prone to granting individual rights (how else could access to social benefits in cash be organized).⁵⁴ And Art. 11 ICESCR (right to an adequate standard of living) seems to primarily address policies aiming at collective welfare.⁵⁵

In sum and from the perspective of our article, the UDHR and the ICESCR do not unequivocally reflect a responsibility of States for the individual welfare of their citizens as associated with the idea of the (Northern and Western) European welfare state. The responsibility of the States was called upon, but did not necessarily relate to recognizing specific needs of individuals or groups.

3 *Poverty as a New Focus of Human Rights and Social Policies (since the 1990s)*

When the ICESCR entered into force in 1976, the control mechanism established under the ICESCR became one of the main venues for interpreting social human rights, requiring the implementing States to write reports to be reviewed by a review committee (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).⁵⁶ The prevalent reading among States in the 1980s as found in the reports basically replicated the positions known from the earlier human rights law-making (developmental thinking, liberalism, socialism); but in the early 1990s, the reading changed considerably.⁵⁷

One impulse for the change came from Eastern Europe. Eastern European countries experienced the demise of socialism, and they quickly turned to Western models for reorganizing their social policies.⁵⁸ A second impulse came, again, from Latin American countries. In the course of the 1980s, Latin American countries had become disillusioned with the structural readjustment programs imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.⁵⁹ Latin American countries – and many other countries in Asia and

54 Art. 9 ICESCR contains just one brief sentence: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance.”

55 Art. 11 (2) ICESCR, detailing the right of everyone to be free from hunger, obliges States to take, “individually or through international cooperation” measures, including specific programs, needed, for instance, “to improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food.” Under Art. 11 (2) ICESCR, these measures aim at certain (collective) outcomes, in particular “the most efficient development and utilization of natural resources.” Individual welfare is conceived of as a by-product of collective welfare.

56 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was established by UN ECOSOC Res 1985/17 (28 May 1985) ESCOR [1985] Supp 1, 15–16.

57 For an account on the following, see U. Davy, ‘How Human Rights Shape Social Citizenship’ 247–259.

58 Ibid. 258.

59 Ibid. 254.

Africa – turned from a course aimed at economic development to one that strongly emphasized social development (a new policy mix often termed ‘human development’).⁶⁰ A third impulse came from UN-affiliated global actors who started to turn their attention to poverty as a global phenomenon and to ‘vulnerable groups’, such as the landless.⁶¹ In the second half of the 1990s, poverty was linked with human rights and conceptualized as a human rights problem, a particularly forceful way of recognizing poverty as a social problem.⁶²

The effect of these impulses was considerable. State party reports submitted to the reviewing committee under the ICESCR changed in tone and emphasis.⁶³ Until 1993, socio-economic inequalities had basically been a non-issue in the reports. After 1993, States started talking about vulnerable groups and poverty, and they did so intensively; States even made an effort to go into the causes of poverty (weak economies; corruption; lack of human capital; armed conflicts) and the intricacies of poverty measurement.⁶⁴ Policies mitigating inequalities became the center of attention, for States around the globe, emphasizing ‘targeted’ measures that would reach out to groups not covered by social insurance.⁶⁵ Table 18.1 pinpoints these changes, drawing on a simple indicator, namely the use of the word “poverty” in State Party reports from 1977 through 1986 (225 reports) and from 2000 through 2009 (144 reports), according to world regions. In the first reporting decade, only 8 per cent of the reports referred to ‘poverty’, mostly in passing. In the most recent reporting decade, the percentage was up to 83 per cent.

The instruments reported on still vary greatly.⁶⁶ For Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)-states and transformation states, instruments mainly include social assistance securing individual subsistence. For developing countries, ‘targeting’ (also) often relates to enabling measures in a broader sense, such as training for employment or food

60 Ibid. 258.

61 See World Bank, *World Development Report 1990. Poverty* (OUP 1990) iii defining poverty as the most pressing global social problem; A. Noël, ‘The New Politics of Global Poverty’ (2006) 6 *Global Social Policy* 304.

62 See, in particular, UNDP, *Human Development Report 1997* (OUP 1997); World Bank, *Development and Human Rights. The Role of the World Bank* (The World Bank 1998); later Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Principles and Guidelines for a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies* (OHCHR 2006), drafted by Paul Hunt, Manfred Nowak and Siddiq Osmani.

63 U. Davy, ‘How Human Rights Shape Social Citizenship’ 251.

64 Ibid. 259.

65 Ibid. 258.

66 U. Davy, ‘How Human Rights Shape Social Citizenship’ 260.

TABLE 18.1 ICESCR state party reports: number of reports mentioning 'Poverty'

Countries	ICESCR State Party Reports	
	1977–1986	2000–2009
High income OECD	7	29
Developed non-OECD	n.a.	5
Eastern Europe	1	27
Southern Europe	1	2
Latin America	2	20
East Asia	1	5
South Asia	2	5
Arab states	1	6
Sub-Saharan Africa	2	12
Dependent Territories	1	7
Other Territories	n.a.	1
Kosovo (UN Mission)	n.a.	1
All countries	18 (=8% of all reports)	120 (=83% of all reports)

Total number of reports: 225 (1977–1986), 144 (2000–2009).⁶⁷

production, supporting micro-enterprises, access to health care, the hand-out of nutrition supplements, or to access to land (land reform), water or sanitation. Moreover, the mechanisms for targeting differ. OECD-states and transformation states tend to rely on formal means-testing, whereas developing countries rather rely on less individualized community-based proxy means tests and on group-based, age-based, gender-based, or region-based targeting. The pro-poor measures reported upon by developing countries seem particularly volatile; the measures may lack a firm basis in law, they may be financed by (private) donors, and they may be administered by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or State-dominated charities.

67 Source: research project FLOOR (see footnote 1), global database ICESCR-SPR 2011 (revised 2012; see footnote 12), data analysis by Ulrike Davy. The country groupings of Table 18.1 refer to the classifications in UNDP, *Human Development Report 2006. Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis* (Palgrave Macmillan 2006) 415 and UNDP, *Human Development Report 2010. The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development* (Palgrave Macmillan 2010) 226.

The volatility of implementation notwithstanding, the shift in the reading of social rights – backed by the major actors of human rights implementation, i.e., the States – indicates, first, that poverty has become a human rights issue and a ‘social problem’ worldwide. And the recognition of poverty as a social problem became less symbolic over time. Second, the shift in the reading indicates a shift from collective to individual notions of welfare and a move towards a (social) policy of recognition that is based on the recognition of individual needs. However (third), the universalist thrust of social rights is bridled since individual need is often identified through the lens of group vulnerability (the aged; children; the very young; pregnant women; displaced persons; people with disabilities; the landless). Special human rights conventions like the 1989 Convention of the Rights of the Child⁶⁸ and the 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities⁶⁹ further testify to the selective construction of recognition (categorical individualism).

IV Changing Paradigms of Social Security in Development Contexts

The social rights proclaimed in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights were not the only expression of the social in the early years after World War II. The 1940s also witnessed the programmatic rise of the ‘welfare state’ or ‘social state’ in Western countries, e.g. in the United Kingdom and Germany.⁷⁰ The ‘welfare state’ included a shift of social policy from class politics and labor law to politics of redistribution and rights-based social security that recognized a broader range of social issues and social groups.⁷¹ The European Union turned into a major international influence on Member States’ recognition of social issues as late as the 1990s.

But in the 1950s, social aspects also figured in the political concepts of international organizations and donors in view of countries of the Global South. In this sense, global social policy started early. In those years, the social was recognized but in an abstract way. This changed over time. We propose to distinguish three paradigms of social security in development contexts in the

68 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3.

69 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entered into force 3 May 2008) 2515 UNTS 12.

70 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (adopted 8 May 1949, enacted 23 May 1949, entered into force 23 May 1949) BGBl. I S. 1 Art. 20 (1).

71 Kaufmann, *Thinking About Social Policy* 107–109

post-war era which reflect different degrees and ways of recognizing the social. These paradigms emerged one after another but in a cumulative way. Present-day global social policy is a compound of all three paradigms. We distinguish three paradigms: ‘development’, rising in the 1950s; ‘human development’, with the 1990s as formative period; and ‘social protection’ spreading since the 2000s.

This periodization derives from empirical analyses of global discourses and of the actual spread of social cash transfers in the global South undertaken in the FLOOR project. While under the development paradigm, welfare needs were recognized only in an abstract way, recognition became more specific and individualized in the human development paradigm, but remained predominantly conceptual (symbolic recognition). Building on the human development paradigm, protagonists of the social protection paradigm went further to develop models of welfare schemes, above all social cash transfers (remedial recognition), in conjunction with actually setting up schemes in the South (embedded recognition).⁷²

1 *The ‘Development’ Paradigm (since the 1950s)*

The notion of ‘development’ which already figured in the earliest interpretation of the social rights laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as shown above, has dominated global politics regarding the Global South from the 1950s. ‘Development’ was underpinned by economic theory and sociological theories of modernization.⁷³ The development paradigm

72 For the analysis of global discourses, see the FLOOR monograph by M. von Gliszczyński, *Cash Transfers and Basic Social Protection – Towards a Development Revolution?* (Palgrave Macmillan 2015, forthcoming). Without explicit reference to the question of recognition, von Gliszczyński conceives of the 1990s as a period of a conceptual “socialization of global social policy,” and of the 2000s (till 2009) as a period of “policy development” during which models of social cash transfers were developed. He adds a third period (since 2009) characterized by a global consensus on cash transfer models and a political consolidation of the idea. Quantitative data on the spread of cash transfer schemes in the South reveal a stepped-up proliferation of schemes during the 2000s, which started in the 1990s for some varieties of cash transfers (database FLOOR-CASH, see footnote 12; unpublished analyses; for non-contributory pensions, see T. Böger, *Diffusing Social Citizenship at the Margins? The Spread of Social Pensions in the Global South*. FLOOR-Working Paper, 2014 Bielefeld University).

73 For economic theory, see W.A. Lewis, *The Theory of Economic Growth* (Allen & Unwin 1955) and W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (CUP 1960); for sociological theories, see M.J. Levy, *Modernization and the Structure of Societies* (Princeton University Press 1966).

built on precedents from colonial times before World War II. In the process of decolonialization, the newly emerging States also subscribed to 'development' – and this included 'social' development –,⁷⁴ later even worded as a right.⁷⁵ Socialist ideas, which emerged especially in some new African nations, also had a developmental thrust.

The immediate focus of developmental strategies was on economic growth, not on individual welfare. But the paradigm had a strong "welfare connotation,"⁷⁶ including the idea of eradicating poverty. The idea was that economic growth in the long run would profit everybody – the 'trickle-down effect.' This notion extended well into the 1970s.⁷⁷ Thus, welfare needs were recognized but only in an abstract and aggregate way, without recognizing specific needs and specific groups in need. Redistributive social policies or even a welfare state were supposed to follow only after the economy had reached maturity.⁷⁸

Besides economic growth as the main welfare strategy, more specific welfare issues played a role. Regarding income maintenance 'social insurance' was the prime model. Social insurance recognized the needs of a specific group, the industrial workers (or parts thereof), thereby excluding the majority of the population, especially the rural population and the urban informal sector. The expectation was that the informal sector of the economy would shrink in the future, and the scope of social insurance would expand automatically. This was another instance of developmental thinking. The global champion of social insurance was the ILO due to its tripartite organization and the ensuing emphasis on issues of formal labor.

Apart from the notions of the social inscribed in the idea of economic growth and social insurance, there was also a broader notion of the social, termed 'social development.' The UN spread the term in the 1950s and 1960s, and it was widely adopted by governments of Southern countries and NGOs.⁷⁹ But 'social development' was a mixed bag, with long, uncoordinated lists of goals and instruments, often simply calling for setting up plans.⁸⁰ The original

74 UNGA Res 1514 (XV) 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples' (14 December 1960) GAOR 15th Session Supp 16 vol. 1, 66.

75 UNGA Res 41/128 'Declaration on the Right to Development' (4 December 1986) GAOR 41st Session Supp 53, 186.

76 J. Midgley, *Social Development. The Developmental Perspective in Social Welfare* (Sage 1995) 2.

77 Ibid. 58.

78 Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* 16.

79 Midgley, *Social Development* 33.

80 See, for instance, UNGA Res 2542 (XXIV) 'Declaration on Social Progress and Development' (11 December 1969) GAOR 24th Session Supp 30, 49.

meaning of ‘social development’ was very narrow, covering social work for marginal groups and community development, but over time the term assumed a broader meaning, yet remained diffuse.⁸¹

The holistic nature of the developmental welfare strategy implied that poverty was measured at the country level. Countries were seen to be ‘poor’ when they had a low gross domestic product per capita – a new global measure of welfare which had been introduced in the 1940s.⁸² The new global poverty measure was a significant step towards identifying need on a global scale. But the measure was about aggregate wealth rather than welfare of identifiable groups of the population. Debates about recognizing specific groups could not ensue.

Regarding the agents of social recognition, collective social responsibility was split between Southern governments, Northern donors, and international organizations. The process of nation building in the course of decolonization prepared the ground for an adoption of a social responsibility by Southern states for the welfare of their citizens which fully emerged only at a later stage.

2 *The ‘Human Development’ Paradigm (since the 1990s)*

While the 1940s were the formative period of global social policy because social human rights were proclaimed for the first time on a global scale, the 1990s were a formative decade in a broader way. International reports, concepts and summits on social issues, including poverty, were mushrooming, related to a notion of ‘human development.’⁸³ In this decade the “new politics of global poverty” built up.⁸⁴ Poverty on a global scale had been a background issue at least since the 1940s or even 1930s, but during the 1990s a global consensus emerged which defined poverty as the global social problem number one, calling for a more specific identification of poverty and the poor and for immediate redress. This change dovetails with the rise of the category of poverty in the States’ reading of human rights as depicted above. In the formative period of the human development paradigm, 1990–2000, the recognition of social problems and problem groups as well as the definition of policy goals became more differentiated and individualized, relating to individual need

81 Midgley, *Social Development* 33 f.; J. Midgley, *Social Development: Theory and Practice* (Sage 2014).

82 D. Speich Chassé, ‘The Use of Global Abstractions. National Income Accounting in the Period of Imperial Decline’ (2011) 6 Special Issue of *Journal of Global History* 7.

83 We choose “human development” to denote the paradigm as a whole because this expression hints at the link between development and social concerns.

84 Noël, ‘The New Politics of Global Poverty.’

(phrased in terms of needy groups) rather than to the living standard of the population at large.

While the Copenhagen Social Summit of 1995 retained a broad and unspecific concept of social development, the recognition of social problems received a distinctive individualistic twist by a new way of measuring poverty – a cognitive side of recognition. Measuring poverty on a global scale poses the problem of accommodating a wide range of diverse countries in which poverty has very different meanings. Therefore, the construction of a global poverty line – defined as the one dollar per day threshold, expressed in purchasing power parities (PPP) – was a critical event in the rise of global social policy. The global poverty line was presented in the World Development Report of 1990, “the first serious attempt to count the world’s poor using a common measure.”⁸⁵ This implied, in contrast to the earlier indicator, gross domestic product (GDP) (even if calculated per capita), that poverty was measured at the individual, not at the country level. The Human Development Report of 1997 further contributed to identifying global poverty by conceiving of poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon, operationalized by a “human poverty index”⁸⁶ which applied the Human Development Index (HDI)⁸⁷ to poverty.

Concepts of poverty and the poor also changed in qualitative terms. Classifications of the poor became more refined, including distinctions of extreme poverty and the designation of life course groups, above all children and the elderly, as key target groups. Furthermore, even the extreme poor were increasingly seen as economic agents rather than passive recipients of aid.⁸⁸ In conjunction, the term “vulnerable groups” emerged, emphasizing the (in)ability to cope with (future) risks rather than (current) need.

Steps from measuring poverty to defining poverty-related policy goals followed. The international development goals proposed by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (1996, representing the point of view of donors) defined multidimensional social minima regarding cash, primary health care and primary education. The goal was to move towards diminishing the number of people who fell below such minima till 2015. Regarding the lack of cash, the core dimension of poverty, the aim was to halve poverty till that date. The OECD’s International Development Goals of 1996 fed into the

85 D. Hulme, *Global Poverty. How Global Governance is Failing the Poor* (Routledge 2010) 29. See World Bank, *World Development Report 1990. Poverty* 27, 139.

86 UNDP, *Human Development Report 1997* (OUP) 15–20.

87 UNDP, *Human Development Report 1990* (OUP) Chapter 1.

88 Von Gliszczynski, *Cash Transfers and Basic Social Protection* Sections 4.1, 4.2.

UN's Millennium Development Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of 2000/2001.⁸⁹

The 'human development' initiatives of the 1990s advanced the global recognition and definition of social problems, above all poverty, in a substantial way, including cognitive tools for monitoring changes in global poverty. But there were limitations in the recognition and identification of poverty. First, the eradication of poverty remained a long-term aim even though the time horizon was shorter and more specific – 'till 2015' – than 'in the long run' as under the development paradigm. Second, the strategy was limited by aiming at reducing (halving) rather than eradicating poverty. Third, responsibility was not clearly attributed. Reference was made in a diffuse way to the 'development community' or 'all stakeholders.' Above all (fourth), the individualization of recognizing social needs was limited by the social construction of groups or categories. Individuals were only addressed via these categories. All in all, global social security took shape in the 1990s, but largely in a discursive or symbolic way rather than by large-scale strategies of designing or even setting up institutions. Remarkably, the Millennium Development Goals did not mention social cash transfers which became a major avenue of poverty reduction soon after. Still, under the human development paradigm, the social was recognized in a more individualized and problem-centered way than under the development paradigm, opening up a discursive window of opportunity for modelling social welfare institutions in the 2000s.

3 *The 'Social Protection' Paradigm (since the 2000s)*

From 1999/2000 the 'social protection' paradigm has been emerging. "Social protection is moving up on the development agenda."⁹⁰ In developing countries formal social security had long been confined to a minority of privileged industrial workers in formal employment (social insurance) and to employees close to government, securing loyalty to the government. This has been changing in the 2000s under the flag of 'social protection.' All major international actors came to agree that it is desirable to extend social protection in developing countries to larger sections of the population, above all to persons in the

89 Hulme, *Global Poverty. How Global Governance is Failing the Poor* 30–34. UNGA Res 55/2 'United Nations Millennium Declaration' (18 September 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 49 vol. 1, 4; UNGA 'Report of the Secretary-General: Road Map towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration' (6 September 2001) UN Doc A/56/326.

90 R. Holzmann, L. Sherburne-Benz and E. Tesliuc, *Social Risk Management: The World Bank's Approach to Social Protection in a Globalizing World* (The World Bank 2003) 1.

informal sector and rural populations.⁹¹ In 2001, the ILO launched the global campaign “Social Security for All.” In this way the ILO made a decisive step beyond its traditional core clientele, the formal workers, who were covered by social insurance, moving toward universal recognition of social need. The call for social protection coverage for all was forcefully underpinned by the spread of the human rights discourse from legal communities to the global public.

From the mid-2000s, a global consensus built up that ‘social cash transfers’, that is, means-tested social assistance-type schemes, are a useful instrument in the fight against poverty.⁹² In the first half of the 2000s, international organizations had developed models of social cash transfers, with four largely consensual types: family allowances, conditional cash transfers to single mothers, social (non-contributory) pensions and general household assistance. Moreover, again, quantification played a role. The ILO used micro simulation to prove that social cash transfers were financially feasible for all countries in the world.⁹³ Setting up social cash transfers created individual entitlements to welfare provisions for the poor, though again mediated by the construction of designated target groups or categories.

Among the newly entitled, the young and the aged stand out. Most social cash transfer target one of these two groups. A stratified order of (embedded) recognition has emerged along the lines of life course groups. The middle-aged, including the unemployed and the working poor, tend to be excluded (Table 18.2), for instance in South Africa which in other respects has a comprehensive arrangement of social cash transfers.⁹⁴ Benefits for the aged, in particular, stand out by reaching minimum standards in many countries, unlike other social cash transfers.⁹⁵ The young and the aged seem to be considered more ‘deserving’, not least because concerns for disincentives to work raised by economic liberals do not apply. More fundamentally, there is evidence that

91 L. Leisering, ‘Extending Social Security to the Excluded: Are Social Cash Transfers to the Poor an Appropriate Way of Fighting Poverty in Developing Countries?’ (2009) 9 *Global Social Policy* 246.

92 Ibid.; L. Leisering and A. Barrientos, ‘Social Citizenship for the Global Poor? The Worldwide Spread of Social Assistance’ in B. Davy, U. Davy and L. Leisering (eds), *Exploring Global Social Citizenship: Human Rights Perspectives* (2013) 22 *International Journal of Social Welfare*, Supplement 1 S50.

93 M. Cichon and K. Hagemejer, ‘Changing the Development Policy Paradigm: Investing in a Social Security Floor For All’ (2007) 60 *International Social Security Review* 169.

94 K. Weible and L. Leisering, ‘South Africa’s System of Social Cash Transfers. Assessing its Social Quality’ in H.-J. Burchardt, A. Tittor and N. Weinmann (eds), *Sozialpolitik in globaler Perspektive. Asien, Afrika und Lateinamerika* (Campus 2012) 247–270.

95 Böger, *Diffusing Social Citizenship at the Margins?* Section IV.1.3.

children have become the prime objects of support on global agendas because they are seen as the economic agents of tomorrow.⁹⁶ Even the political support of cash transfers for the aged ('social pensions') was boosted when the argument was introduced in the debate that the aged pass part of their pension to their grandchildren. Persons of working age are less seen to be in need of support because they do not lack agency.

The crucial step from the symbolic recognition of needy or vulnerable groups (human development paradigm) to modelling and setting up cash transfer schemes (social protection paradigm) was made possible by the discovery of the poor as economic agents under the human development paradigm in the 1990s. Enabling measures like social services and micro credit had spread long before the 2000s, but non-contributory monetary benefits came to be seen as economically enabling and contributing to economic growth as late as the 2000s. In this way, the idea of individual entitlements to cash for the poor could be founded in the development paradigm. In the process, the concept of development was 'socialized' and individualized and, vice versa, the concept of global social protection was 'filtered' by developmental thinking.⁹⁷

The social protection paradigm thus differs from the human development paradigm by laying down not only objectives and discursive standards, but by

TABLE 18.2 *Stratified order of recognition – target groups of social cash transfers in the global south (2012/2013)*⁹⁸

Target group	Children	Old age	Disabled	Working age	Any citizen	Smaller residual groups
Number of cash transfer schemes	122	105	94	28	58	80
in %	43%	37%	33%	10%	20%	28%

N = 284, missing values: 4

96 Von Gliszczynski, *Cash Transfers and Basic Social Protection* Sections 4.1, 4.2.

97 Ibid. Section 4.2.

98 Numbers and percentages refer to all social cash transfer schemes in all countries of the Global South. Transfer schemes may address more than one target group, therefore the percentages add up to more than 100%. Source: research project FLOOR (see footnote 1), global database FLOOR-CASH (data construction and analysis by Katrin Weible; principal investigator Lutz Leisering; see footnote 12).

developing and promoting institutional models or instruments to implement these objectives – remedial and, if successful, embedded recognition. Social cash transfers and other instruments imply an individualized and institutionalized approach to poverty.⁹⁹ So policies went from defining and identifying social problems (recognition) to setting up institutions (redistribution). The shift from the human development paradigm to the social protection paradigm became tangible in the adoption of social cash transfers as a means to advance the fulfilment of the MDGs which originally had not referred to cash transfers. The move towards the idea of providing individualized social protection for all people in the world culminated in the ‘Social Protection Floor Initiative’ (SPF-I), launched by the UN in 2009, with the ILO and the World Health Organization (WHO) as lead organizations.¹⁰⁰ The outcome was the ILO Recommendation 202 ‘Recommendation concerning National Floors of Social Protection’, 14 June 2012.¹⁰¹ This was a historical event, a recognition of the social at a grand scale. But the responsibility to define minimum standards was shifted to the States during the negotiations.¹⁰²

Regarding the agents of both recognition and redistribution, the activity of Southern governments in the field of welfare policies has expanded since the 2000s. Welfare concerns have become issues in national elections more than before, and social problems are more distinctly voiced in State Party reports under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as shown in Section III. Deacon’s diagnosis of the ‘socialization of global politics’ needs to be complemented by the diagnosis ‘socialization of national politics’ in the Global South, adding up to a ‘layered system of recognition’, with various links as well as frictions between the two layers.

v Global Land Policy as Recognition of the Social

Land policy is not normally seen as part of global social policy. Yet, global land policy has been ‘socialized’ to a degree particular since the 1990s (extending Deacon’s diagnosis of a “socialization of global politics,” mentioned above, to

99 A. Barrientos, *Social Assistance in Developing Countries* (CUP 2013); Leisering, ‘Extending Social Security to the Excluded’.

100 ILO and WHO, *The Social Protection Floor. A Joint Crisis Initiative of the UN Chief Executives Board for Co-Ordination on the Social Protection Floor* (ILO, WHO October 2009).

101 B. Deacon, *Global Social Policy in the Making. The Foundations of the Social Protection Floor* (Policy Press 2013); *Global Social Policy* (2014) 14 no. 3.

102 Deacon, *Global Social Policy in the Making*.

land). Global policymakers, such as UN Habitat¹⁰³ or the World Bank,¹⁰⁴ and World Society events, such as the lively exchange of reports, opinions, and comments under ICESCR¹⁰⁵ or the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro,¹⁰⁶ have been addressing land issues from a socio-ecological perspective.¹⁰⁷ Global land policy has been moving from issues of the formal (re-)distribution of property in land to the recognition of land use needs.

1 *Land and the Social*

In early discourses on ‘the social’, land occupied a prominent position, notably in the works of Thomas Paine,¹⁰⁸ Henry George,¹⁰⁹ Adolf Damaschke¹¹⁰ or Karl Polanyi.¹¹¹ Today, however, social policy in OECD-countries hardly ever includes land rights, but assumes that the poor, assisted by cash payments or in kind benefits, achieve land uses through the market or social housing. In contrast, social policy in the Global South is unimaginable without land policy.

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- 103 UN Habitat and Global Land Tool Network, *Secure Land Rights for All* (UN Habitat 2008); UN Habitat, *The Challenge of Slums. Global Report on Human Settlements* (Earthscan 2003); UN Habitat, *Planning Sustainable Cities. Global Report on Human Settlements 2009* (Earthscan 2009).
- 104 K. Deininger, *Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction* (OUP 2003); K. Deininger, C. Augustinus, S. Enemark and P. Munro-Faure (eds), *Innovations in Land Rights Recognition, Administration, and Governance* (World Bank 2010).
- 105 See, e.g., the list of criteria for adequate housing (Art. 11 ICESCR) adopted by the CESCR ‘General Comment No 4: The Right to Adequate Housing’ (1991) in CESCR, *Report on Sixth Session* (1992) E/C.12/1991/4, Annex III (7–8). The human rights approach to poverty reduction confirms the list: OHCHR, *Human Rights and Poverty Reduction* (OHCHR, WHO December 2008), paras. 153–170.
- 106 UN Conference on Sustainable Development ‘Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development’ (20–22 June 2012) UN Doc A/CONF/216.16.
- 107 B. Davy ‘The Poor and the Land: Poverty, Property, Planning (Centenary Paper)’ (2009) 80 *Town Planning Review* 228; B. Davy, *Land Policy. Planning and the Spatial Consequences of Property* (Ashgate 2012); B. Davy (ed), ‘Spatial Planning and Human Rights’ (2014) 13 *Planning Theory* (Special Issue) No. 4.
- 108 Th. Paine, *Agrarian Justice, Being a Plan for Meliorating the Condition of Man* (2nd ed Adlard & Parsons 1903).
- 109 H. George, *Progress and Poverty. An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions and of Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth* (United States Book Co. 1889).
- 110 A. Damaschke, *Die Bodenreform. Grundsätzliches und Geschichtliches zur Erkenntnis und Überwindung der sozialen Not* (5th ed Gustav Fischer 1911).
- 111 K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Beacon Press 1944).

Land reform movements were popular in the wake of decolonization,¹¹² presumably because the decolonized countries were unable to establish contribution – or tax-based systems of social security. Policymakers in Latin America, Africa and Asia have little doubt that land policy is essential for a country's social policy. For example, the preamble to the Declaration on Land Issues and Challenges in Africa, closely connects “poverty eradication” and “the centrality of land to sustainable socio-economic growth, development and the security of the social, economic and cultural livelihoods of our people.”¹¹³ Land issues have been part of ‘social development’ in the broader meaning of the term.¹¹⁴

Many consider private property the most important right to use land,¹¹⁵ but everybody, including even wealthy landowners, needs to have access to land that does not belong to them (e.g., public streets). Accordingly, a system of rights to use land must include more kinds of rights than private property: Use rights deriving from contract law, public use rights, common property or customary land use rights, to name a few.¹¹⁶

2 *Land Policies between Distribution and Recognition*

A land policy is an act of (re-)distribution,¹¹⁷ if it takes land from present landowners and gives it to landless persons. This implies a social recognition of the landless class, but in an abstract fashion. Land policies that recognize more specific needs (referring to ‘the landless’ or more specifically to ‘women’ and other vulnerable groups seen to be excluded from access to land) and respond to these needs by establishing land use rights imply embedded recognition. Land policies may also reflect symbolic recognition in that they recognize certain needs to use land, but are not directly geared to the redistribution of use rights in land. Finally, land policies are a case of ‘constitutionalized recognition’, if they establish a legal right to the use of land by the poor enshrined in

112 S.M. Borrás, *Pro-Poor Land Reform* (University of Ottawa Press 2007); B. Chigara, *Land Reform Policy. The Challenge of Human Rights Law* (Ashgate 2004).

113 African Union, ‘Declaration on Land Issues and Challenges in Africa’ (2009) Assembly/AU/Decl. I (XIII) Rev. 1.

114 Midgley, *Social Development. The Developmental Perspective in Social Welfare* 34.

115 H.M. Jacobs, ‘Private Property and Human Rights: A Mismatch in the 21st Century?’ in B. Davy, U. Davy and L. Leisering (eds), *Exploring Global Social Citizenship: Human Rights Perspectives* (2013) 22 *International Journal of Social Welfare*, Supplement 1 S85.

116 B. Davy, ‘Polyrational Property: Rules for the Many Uses of Land’ (2014) 8 *International Journal of the Commons* 472.

117 Often referred to as ‘land reform’: Borrás, *Pro-Poor Land Reform*; Chigara, *Land Reform Policy*.

national constitutions or international human rights. The three varieties of land policies that reflect embedded, symbolic and constitutionalized recognition draw on conceptions of basic needs, human dignity, and minimal access to vital land uses respectively.

Recognition stands in stark contrast to abstract egalitarian tenets. Egalitarian approaches to land policy demand that ‘the land’ be distributed more equally.¹¹⁸ Franz Oppenheimer, a German sociologist, used an egalitarian approach to prove that the land monopoly is not natural, but artificial. In a 1913 treatise on the social question and socialism, Oppenheimer called private property’s impact on land uses *Bodensperre*, literally the land barrier.¹¹⁹ Property institutions rather than resource scarcity, he asserted, exclude most people from owning land. The entitlement approach applies a similar idea to explain the relationship between poverty and famines.¹²⁰

The egalitarian approach is not, however, the only way to redistribute the benefits of land ownership. Thomas Paine suggested a plan that combined land policy and social policy without the expropriation or displacement of the current landowners. As private property in land would deprive non-owners of their right to the “common property of the human race,”¹²¹ all landowners should pay a land tax to a national fund. The national fund should disburse the payments to young and elderly persons.¹²² Paine’s blueprint is a case of embedded recognition. The concept of social assistance for all, financed by contributions from landowners, is surprisingly modern. It anticipates that a contribution-based welfare system is more tolerable to the wealthy than a redistribution of property from wealthy landowners to needy persons. Classic land reformers have preserved the link between land reform and social policy.¹²³ The “great transformation” interrupted this link.¹²⁴ In OECD countries, the introduction of the welfare state decoupled the land question from the social question. Contribution-based and tax-based social security is financed through jobs, salaries, and income or sales taxes. Moreover, in post-World War II Europe, land reform was increasingly associated with communism and thereby discredited.

118 St. White, *The Civic Minimum. On the Rights and Obligations of Economic Citizenship* (OUP 2003).

119 F. Oppenheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften. Schriften zur Demokratie und sozialen Marktwirtschaft* vol. I (Akademie Verlag 1959) 631–643.

120 A. Sen and J. Drèze, *The Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze Omnibus* (OUP 1999) 45–51.

121 Paine, *Agrarian Justice* 12.

122 Ibid. 15–16.

123 See, e.g., George, *Progress and Poverty*; Damaschke, *Bodenreform*.

124 Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* 178–191.

3 *Land Policy as Constitutionalized Recognition: International Human Rights since 1948*

International human rights law does not establish explicitly a right to land. Several human rights, however, have a spatial dimension. We need to use land to enjoy our right to life,¹²⁵ our right of peaceful assembly,¹²⁶ our right to work,¹²⁷ our right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food and housing.¹²⁸ Exercising each of these rights directly involves the use of land. Each of these rights means nothing, if the land use indispensable for exercising the right is denied.

The constitutionalized recognition of minimal land uses has started on the global level with the negotiations on the UDHR which establishes a complex system of positive and negative property rights¹²⁹ connecting social issues and land use needs. Property relations comply with human rights, if no one is held in slavery or servitude,¹³⁰ marriage is entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses,¹³¹ and the government respects everyone's right to own private property¹³² and fulfils everyone's right to an adequate standard of living.¹³³

Although private property gets most of the attention,¹³⁴ Art. 17 UDHR as such was never transformed into a legally binding treaty and remained an act of symbolic recognition. Universal human rights protect private property only with respect to, among others, women,¹³⁵ migrant workers,¹³⁶ persons with disabilities,¹³⁷ or indigenous peoples.¹³⁸ These rights reflect a constitutionalized

125 Art. 6 (1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (in the following: ICCPR).

126 Art. 21 ICCPR.

127 Art. 6 (1) ICESCR.

128 Art. 11 (1) ICESCR.

129 B. Davy, *Land Policy* 167–176.

130 Art. 4 UDHR.

131 Art. 16 (2) UDHR.

132 Art. 17 UDHR.

133 Art. 25 UDHR.

134 Jacobs, 'Private Property and Human Rights'.

135 Arts. 15 and 16 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13.

136 Art. 15 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (adopted 18 December 1990, entered into force 1 July 2003) 2220 UNTS 3.

137 Art. 12 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entered into force 3 May 2008) 2515 UNTS 12.

138 Art. 26 UNGA Res 61/178 'United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples' (13 September 2007) GAOR 61st Session Supp 49 vol. 3, 15.

recognition of particularly vulnerable groups. As shown above for human rights, the social recognition of land use needs is selectively constructed in categorical terms, falling short of full universalism and individualism.

Moreover, Art. 25 UDHR was transformed into binding treaty law by Art. 11 ICESCR. The ‘right to an adequate standard of living’ implies the right to use land, for example, with respect to housing. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its General Comment No. 4, asserts that “the right to housing [...] should be seen as the right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity.”¹³⁹ The Committee takes into account the legal security of tenure, the availability of services, materials, facilities, and infrastructure, affordability, habitability, accessibility, location, and cultural adequacy.¹⁴⁰ The human rights approach to poverty reduction which emerged in the late 1990s and 2000s (see above) confirms the list.¹⁴¹ The implementation of constitutionalized recognition of land use rights may often remain weak. The right to housing or the right to food, however, are strongly embedded – as ideas or values – in Art. 25 UDHR or Art. 11 ICESCR, and both instances of constitutionalized recognition have put access to land on the social policy agenda.

4 *Land Policy as Symbolic Recognition: The Pro-Poor Land Discourse since the 1990s*

Over the past two decades, many global policymakers have linked poverty reduction and social policy with land policy. The coupling of social policy and land policy is called “pro-poor land policy,” recognizing the land use needs of the poor independently from specific demands for redistribution:

What does pro-poor mean? A pro-poor approach is one that takes into account people living in poverty. In the case of cities, this means treating all its citizens equally, including those living in slums, in regard to access to land and services.¹⁴²

The term ‘pro-poor land policy’ expresses the recognition of the claim to consider explicitly the vital interests of the poor in the design of land policies. Pro-poor land policies do not demand sweeping land reforms and imply a shift

139 CESCR ‘General Comment No 4: The Right to Adequate Housing’ (1991) in CESCR ‘Report on Sixth Session’ (1992) E/C.12/1991/4, Annex III, para. 7.

140 Ibid. para. 8.

141 OHCHR, *Human Rights and Poverty Reduction* 153–170.

142 C. Augustinus and E. Lind, *How to Develop a Pro-poor Land Policy. Process, Guide and Lessons* (UN Habitat 2007) 5.

to the politics of recognition. We conceive of this change in global discourses as an act of social learning. If stakeholders cannot achieve their goals by redistribution, perhaps they expect to fare better by taking the smaller steps of a politics of recognition. Global policymakers, who have contributed to the politics of recognition, use a variety of values and strategies to make their case for pro-poor land policy.¹⁴³

One approach to pro-poor land policy is connected to sustainable development, a global policy goal defined by the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development. It emphasizes State's obligations and demands that land use planning and management secure access to land for marginalized individuals and groups.¹⁴⁴ The 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro confirmed this managerial approach to land policies.¹⁴⁵ In a different vein, the debate triggered by de Soto,¹⁴⁶ focuses on the formalization of land titles. The land titling approach influenced, among others, the World Bank approach to pro-poor land policy.¹⁴⁷ The land titling approach emphasizes cadastral maps, land registers (as cognitive requisites of recognition), and formal land rights protected by independent courts. A third approach accentuates the role of local communities in producing (often: non-State) welfare. Many community-based efforts to reduce poverty through communal tenure draw from Elinor Ostrom's work on common pool resources.¹⁴⁸ Several global actors, such as UN Habitat, adopt the spirit of local strategies for their agenda setting.¹⁴⁹

143 B. Davy, *The Land and the Poor* 248–251.

144 UN Conference on Environment and Development 'Agenda 21' (12 August 1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (vol. 1), 9; UN Conference on Environment and Development 'Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests' (14 June 1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (vol. 1), 480; UN Conference on Environment and Development 'Rio Declaration on Environment and Development' (14 June 1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (vol. 1), 3.

145 UN Conference on Sustainable Development, 'Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development'.

146 H. de Soto, *The Mystery of Capital. Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else* (Basic Books 2000).

147 Deininger, *Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction*; Deininger, Augustinus, Enemark and Munro-Faure (eds), *Innovations in Land Rights Recognition, Administration, and Governance*.

148 E. Ostrom, *Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* (CUP 1990); E. Ostrom and N. Dolšák (eds), *The Commons in the New Millennium. Challenges and Adaptations* (MIT Press 2003).

149 Augustinus and Lind, *How to Develop a Pro-poor Land Policy. Process, Guide and Lessons*.

The three examples illustrate the discursive rise of ‘the social’ in a field, land policy, which is central to development concerns, but receives little attention in the global social policy literature which focuses on elements of social policy familiar from Western welfare states. Presently, pro-poor land policies are predominantly framed as symbolic recognition of ‘the social.’ Global policymakers examine the opportunities of the poor to use land and advance several types of “socio-ecological land policy.”¹⁵⁰ We can conclude from the history of land policy as social policy that symbolic recognition – of claims to living space, vital land use rights, empowerment, local attachments to land – can be a powerful source of inspiration to a variety of redistributive strategies.

VI Conclusion: Recognition and Redistribution – The Evolution of Global Social Policy in the Post-World War II Era

Tracing changes since the 1940s in international human rights and in two areas of global policy, social security and land, we found that underneath the visible global spread of redistributive schemes – social insurance, social services and social cash transfers – there is a history of a growing socio-cultural recognition of the ‘social’ in world politics: of identifying and publicly addressing social problems, of naming individuals and social groups affected by social problems and, more generally, of the acknowledgment by collective actors of a responsibility for meeting welfare needs. The politics of recognition have provided a normative foundation for the emergence of redistributive social policies. In fact, since the early 2000s, proponents of redistributive policies have increasingly referred to human rights, to individualized notions of social development like ‘human development’ and ‘social protection’, and to pro-poor land policy to frame their claims to extending individual entitlements to welfare benefits. This confirms and deepens Deacon’s thesis of a “globalization of social policy”¹⁵¹ in the dimension of ideas and categories of social recognition.

We have also argued that the politics of recognition constitute a strand of global social policy in their own right that has been neglected in the literature. Deacon’s tenet of a “socialization of global politics” which refers to redistribution needs to be extended to include processes of recognition. Recognition reflects a morality of social concerns and a culture of respect. Our findings substantiate Kaufmann’s assumption of the dual character of modern social policy, embracing both redistribution and recognition.

¹⁵⁰ B. Davy, *The Land and the Poor* 250.

¹⁵¹ Deacon et al., *Global Social Policy* 2f.

Highlighting the recognition side leads to a somewhat different picture of the rise – the timing and the nature – of global social policy than found in the literature.

1 *Periodization*

The concern for welfare has intensified in global politics in the 1990s, as emphasized in most of the literature. But social issues in global politics have a longer history. The history of global social policy started as early as the 1940s, with social human rights as constitutionalized recognition. However, at the time, social human rights were not yet uniformly interpreted as recognizing the social in individualized terms. Similarly, concepts of development for the global South in the 1950s already included social objectives but of a holistic kind (raising living conditions of the population at large through economic growth) or in a massively non-inclusive way (through the model of social insurance for formal workers). Hence, the 1940s and 1950s as well as the 1990s (symbolic recognition; shifting interpretation of social human rights) were formative decades of the politics of recognition. Redistributive schemes were set up on a broader and more inclusive scale as late as the 2000s. Processes of recognition have opened up a ‘discursive window of opportunity’ that was filled by modelling and setting up novel welfare institutions in the 2000s.¹⁵² After World War II the world has gradually become more sensitive to social issues, with international organizations, donors and countries in the Global South as key agents. In the global North, the post-World War II decades witnessed a massive expansion of social security under the flag of the ‘welfare state.’

2 *The Changing Nature of Social Concerns*

In the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s global social policy was dominated by holistic and structural concepts of welfare, focusing on national development, economic growth and land reform, as exemplified by the three fields social human rights, social security and land policy. From the 1990s, in all three fields, the recognition of the social became more specific and more individualized. A differentiated range of present needs and of groups in need was identified rather than proclaiming aggregate and long-term welfare aims for the nation at large. Individual welfare entitlements for the poor (through cash transfer schemes set up in the 2000s) could be reconciled with developmental thinking since developmentalists had discovered the poor as economic agents in the 1990s. The development paradigm became ‘socialized’ and individualized, espousing

¹⁵² Von Gliszczynski, *Cash Transfers and Basic Social Protection*.

not only growth *for* the poor – ‘pro-poor growth’, ‘pro-poor land policy’ – but also growth *by* the poor, to be underpinned by social protection.

3 *Cognitive Recognition: Quantification*

Recognition includes a cognitive mode, namely quantitative measurement. In the 1940s, the gross domestic product was invented to measure the wealth and poverty of states. In the 1990s, individualized measures of need became a major driver of identifying and monitoring global social problems, such as the \$1/day measure of poverty calculated in purchasing power parities. Quantification also served to classify the poor, for example, distinguishing degrees of poverty. Registration of the poor also became an issue, to identify potential beneficiaries of social cash transfers and holders of land use rights.

4 *Agents of Recognition*

The growing recognition of the social in global politics went along with a broader range of agents that attended to social concerns or even assumed collective social responsibility. International organization became ‘socialized’ across conventional political party lines. Long-standing organizations specializing in social issues, like the ILO or, later, the WHO, widened their field of activities. Other organizations that originally specialized in financial or developmental issues, above all the World Bank, increasingly attended to ‘social’ issues.¹⁵³ Governments in the Global South have also been assuming a larger role in social policy in the 1990s and even more since the 2000s, with social security issues figuring in national elections as common in Western welfare states. A Southern ‘socialization of national politics’ goes hand in hand with Deacon’s “socialization of global politics,” producing a layered structure of social policy and social recognition in the world society. Analyzing how different agents became socialized in different ways is a field for future research.

5 *The Impact of Recognition: Societal Integration*

These changes – the increasing identification of global social problems and of needy groups (entailing an individualization, differentiation, temporalization and quantification of social recognition) and the proliferation of global ‘social’ agents – are socio-cultural and political rather than economic processes. If social policy is conceived as a response to problems of societal integration, socio-cultural impacts are as important as economic impacts. Kaufmann distinguishes three requirements of societal integration:¹⁵⁴ securing functional

¹⁵³ Hall, ‘Social Policies in the World Bank’.

¹⁵⁴ Kaufmann, ‘Schwindet die integrative Funktion des Sozialstaats?’ 255f.

relationships in society; fostering person-related moral recognition, including the recognition of reciprocity and difference; and establishing a constitutionalized order of society. Redistributive measures address the first requirement while the second requirement is served by processes of both embedded and symbolic recognition. The third requirement is advanced by constitutionalized recognition. Thus, both redistribution and recognition have a role to play in the integration of (world) society. In the light of John W. Meyer's theory of world society, the growing representation of social problems in the world testifies to the rise of a world culture. "A world with so many widely discussed social problems is a world of Durkheimian and Simmelian integration, however much it may also seem driven by disintegrative tendencies."¹⁵⁵

6 *Explanations of the Rise of Recognition*

Explaining the post-World War II emergence of global social policy, both as redistribution and recognition, is a task for future research. The explanation of far-reaching macro processes is usually difficult. The analysis of the recognition side of global social policy at least gives some hints at possible discursive factors that may have contributed to the rise of global social policy. For the first formative decade, the 1940s, the "colossal disaster of World War II" and related visions of a post-war political order have played a role,¹⁵⁶ such as Roosevelt's 'Four Freedoms' of 1941 – freedom of speech, of religion, from fear and from want – and Roosevelt's and Churchill's "Freedom from fear and want" in their Atlantic Charter of the same year, which fed into the programmatic orientation of the UN in 1945.¹⁵⁷

The breakthrough in the 1990s is more difficult to explain. The end of the Cold War may have played a role, facilitating a shift of global politics from security matters to social issues as postulated by Deacon. At the same time, the reconstruction of the Eastern European countries raised questions of social policy-making addressed by international organizations. Regarding the developing countries, the neglect of social issues in the 'structural adjustment' programs of the World Bank during the 1980s may have turned the tide towards more 'socially' oriented concepts of development. The rise of democratic governments in Southern countries may have propelled social policy issues from below. Still, various departures in the 1990s, such as the cognitive turn described above (with the introduction of the first truly global poverty indicator), cannot be easily attributed to these factors.

¹⁵⁵ Meyer, *World Society* 199.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ See Kaufmann, *European Foundations of the Welfare State* Chapter 4.

7 *Limitations of Recognition and Prospects*

Highlighting the recognition strand of global social policy also reveals limitations of the 'socialization' of global politics, qualifying Deacon and confirming Kaufmann's skepticism about the chances for solidarity and social integration in the world society. The universalistic claims of international organizations are categorically bridled. International organizations and specialized human rights conventions construct categories like children, the disabled or pregnant mothers that channel the attribution of need and entitlement. The ensuing hierarchy of deservingness constitutes a selective order of recognition that reflects organizational domains rather than need per se. Developmental concerns may also narrow down the scope of recognition, for instance, when women are primarily recognized as mothers ('reproductive health') and children as future agents of economic growth. Limitations of the scope of social recognition may limit the further expansion of redistributive global policies.

At the same time, there is a recognition overload. Global social politics abounds with semantics and communications signaling respect for social groups. Recognition has become a routine exercise. Recognition often is only talk, loosely coupled to (redistributive) action. Recognition overload may cover up the lack of substantial redistribution which still characterizes most of global social policy. Moreover, in the face of the cultural diversity of world society, global recognition has to rely on highly generalized symbols and semantics applicable across the world. Such communication may be too thin to be meaningful in local contexts.

This leads back to the layered structure of social policy and social recognition in the world society. Ultimately, a sustainable normative foundation of global social policy can only emerge from an interaction of global and national ideas. On the recognition side, the future of the global spread of social policy depends on how global ideas are interpreted in local contexts and blended with local ideas, and, vice versa, how local ideas feed into global discourses. Analyzing the interaction of global patterns of recognition with the more specific and diverse national orders of recognition is a field for further research.